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THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
Donald Tusk cannot be criticised for mincing his 
words. The President of the European Council is deeply 
frustrated at Britain’s inability to define its future 
relationship with the European Union. After the close 
of the European Council meeting on 29 June, he warned 
the UK that “this is the last call to lay the cards on the 
table”. The official communiqué of the meeting chided 
the British for their lack of progress in completing 
the Withdrawal Agreement, not least on the thorny 
question of the Irish border, and added:
“Work must also be accelerated with a 
view to preparing a political declaration on 
the framework for the future relationship. 
This requires further clarity as well as 
realistic and workable proposals from the 
UK as regards its position on the future 
relationship.”
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker told the 
press: “We cannot go on to live with a split cabinet. They 
have to say what they want and we will respond to that”.
Missed deadlines, ambiguity and indecision 
have dogged the UK’s performance 
ever since the Prime Minister sent her 
peremptory letter to Mr Tusk on 29 March 
2017, triggering the Article 50 process.
Missed deadlines, ambiguity and indecision have 
dogged the UK’s performance ever since the Prime 
Minister sent her peremptory letter to Mr Tusk on 29 
March 2017, triggering the Article 50 process. To be fair, 
Theresa May has not been helped by her Conservative 
party, which having been riven with division on Europe 
for forty years, is now at breaking point. Nor has she 
received the support a prime minister might expect 
from her cabinet which contains an unusually high 
quota of incompetent and disloyal ministers. 
Moreover, while trying to negotiate Brexit in Brussels, 
the Prime Minister has had to surf the turbulent cross-
party currents of a parliament at Westminster that is 
still angry and emasculated in the aftermath of the 
referendum which it blithely promoted — and lost. 
But still. When Mrs May accepted the top job on the 
momentous premise of leading the country out of the 
European Union, she was immediately categorical 
in laying down terms and conditions based on 
her singular interpretation of the meaning of the 
referendum vote. She has not been keen subsequently 
to take other advice, some of it admittedly gratuitous.1 
The EU side has been plentiful in supplying clear 
guidelines and negotiating directives (and even slides 
and tweets) which contradict her position.  
But bend she does not. 
A WHITE PAPER
Agonisingly, the EU still waits for the British 
government to send it a detailed prospectus for the 
post-Brexit relationship. A White Paper that was 
promised before last week’s European Council was 
postponed until after (probably 11 July). Apparently 
the first draft of this document, under the auspices 
of David Davis, has reached an alarming 190 pages. If 
past form is anything to go by, the White Paper will 
be repetitive, poorly edited, and filled with banalities 
aimed at bamboozling a British domestic audience. Let 
us hope for something better than that, and something 
new, even if it is only a case of advancing a clear choice 
between a narrow trade agreement on the one hand 
and continuing regulatory alignment on the other. The 
White Paper will also have to spell out the cabinet’s 
final proposals with respect to customs. 
The UK’s definitive blueprint for its long-term future 
relationship with the EU is more likely to take the 
form of a written contribution to the drafting of the 
Political Declaration which is to accompany the Article 
50 Withdrawal Agreement. This British memorandum is 
being drafted under the auspices of Olly Robbins, Mrs 
May’s chief Brexit negotiator. It is expected to be much 
more concise than the White Paper and is intended to 
be dispatched to Brussels later in July to give the EU 27 
something serious to work on. 
THE POLITICAL DECLARATION
The Political Declaration will define the framework for 
the future relations between the UK and the EU that 
is called for in Article 50(2). The Declaration is not an 
optional extra. If there is no consensus on the future 
framework, and there is nothing to take account of, the 
Withdrawal Agreement will become a mere secession 
treaty, effectively reduced to extricating the EU from 
its rights in and obligations to the UK. If there is no 
pointer to Britain’s future landing zone, the much-
needed transition period can only be an extension 
of the status quo, postponing but not preventing the 
cliff-edge Brexit. And without a convincing orientation 
towards a long-term partnership there will be no 
agreement to extend the transition period beyond  
31 December 2020. 
The question of the format of the Political Declaration 
remains to be resolved. The Council intends to keep 
the Declaration at arms’ length from the Withdrawal 
Agreement and only to make a reference to it in the 
Withdrawal Agreement as an accompanying document. 
This semi-detachment is intended to discourage any 
national parliament among the 27 from treating the 
Withdrawal Agreement as a ‘mixed agreement’ in 
terms of EU law requiring ratification by all member 
states. Article 50 lays down simply enough that the 
Withdrawal Agreement shall be concluded on behalf 
3
4comprise the heads of agreement of the final post-
Brexit treaty. Through this exercise Mr Tusk is anxious 
not only to gather together his 27 but also to bind the 
British to pursue a consistent objective, knowing full 
well that Mrs May might not be the prime minister who 
concludes the negotiation. 
Britain’s hesitation in producing its own prospectus 
has meant that discussions among the 27 about 
the EU’s future relationship with the UK are not far 
advanced. Some argue that such talk is even now 
premature. Finding Brexit an unwelcome distraction 
from more important business, a few EU leaders would 
settle for making a short, general statement about the 
desirability of keeping the Brits as good neighbours 
(Article 8 TEU). But such a lazy approach is insufficient 
and underestimates the adverse impact of Brexit on 
the Union as a whole. The European Council needs to 
recognise that the secession of the UK renders the EU 
smaller, poorer and weaker. The Political Declaration is 
the immediate opportunity for the 27 leaders to make a 
considered response to the reputational blow suffered 
by the Union and to engage in some deeper reflection 
about ‘the future of Europe’ which Mr Tusk hopes to 
conclude at a summit meeting in Sibiu, Romania, next May. 
LOSING THE EUROPEAN PLOT
Many in Britain, and not just Brexiteers, resent being 
treated by the EU like third-country aliens. But if 
the UK is to regain its credibility and recuperate its 
position in European affairs post-Brexit, it needs to 
show itself much more understanding of the EU’s own 
plight. The EU never invited the UK to leave it. Britain’s 
unilateral decision to depart destabilises the Union. It 
puts the EU 27 under substantial budgetary pressure, 
and causes costly disruption. It gives an easy win to 
nationalists elsewhere in Europe. No doubt it delights 
Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. Brexit weakens 
the fabric of the Union, and may tempt other member 
states down the same path. 
Furthermore, if the outcome of the referendum was 
a bad shock to the system, the manner in which the 
UK government has conducted itself in the Article 50 
negotiations has hardly added lustre to Britain’s soiled 
reputation as a European partner. Naturally, it is the 
EU’s Anglophiles – the Danes, Dutch and Irish – who 
resent Brexit most. While nobody wants to humiliate 
the British, it can hardly come as a shock to the British 
establishment that the EU is now in the driving seat 
and not they. As Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar told the 
Financial Times (28 June): “Any relationship that exists 
in the future between the EU and the UK isn’t going to 
be one of absolute equals. We’re 500m people; the UK is 
60m. The basic facts need to be realised and understood”. 
CHEQUERS
The challenge, therefore, that confronts the Tory 
cabinet at its meeting at Chequers on 6 July is to come 
to terms with Britain’s decline as a European power.4 
of the Union by the Council, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament. The Article 50 
formula suggests that the Political Declaration will be 
treated as the product of ‘27+1’ and not as a formal 
accord between the 28. Indeed, a legally binding treaty 
between the UK and the EU can only be concluded once 
the UK has ceased to be a member state. 
If there is no pointer to Britain’s 
future landing zone, the much-needed 
transition period can only be an 
extension of the status quo, postponing 
but not preventing the cliff-edge Brexit.
Many Brexiteers in Britain will seek to dismiss the 
Political Declaration as non-binding. But recently, in 
an interesting development, the lead Brexit committee 
of the House of Commons argues to the contrary. Its 
MPs want to treat the Withdrawal Agreement and 
the Political Declaration as a single integral package 
requiring a vote of approval (or, more ambiguously, 
amendment) before it can enter into force. The 
committee demands that the Declaration should 
achieve a “high level of detail” and be formally annexed 
to the Withdrawal Agreement “in order to give its 
content greater force”.2
The same committee appears now to realise that the 
Westminster Parliament can hardly decline to grant 
its consent to the Brexit package. A vote to send the 
government back to the negotiating table in Brussels is 
highly unlikely to succeed in squeezing from the EU 27 
a somehow better deal. The MPs may try to keep open 
the possibility of asking for a “limited extension” of the 
Article 50 timetable, but they know that all 27 states 
would struggle to agree even to make this concession. 
Nobody sane or sober in London now argues that no 
deal is better than a bad deal. 
As far as the EU is concerned, while the Political 
Declaration will not be a formal law of the Council, it 
will have the effect of soft law, carrying much more 
weight than the standard conclusions of a meeting 
of the European Council. It will bind the European 
Council politically. Were the Political Declaration to be 
later overturned, it would require a unanimous decision 
of equal solemnity. It will also form a vital part of the 
European Parliament’s considerations as it decides 
whether to approve the package tabled before it by the 
Council and Commission.3
President Tusk’s task is to corral the 27 leaders 
behind the Political Declaration. Once he has done 
so, he will use it, in effect, as the first draft of the 
mandate that will eventually be issued by the Council 
to the Commission for the negotiation of the future 
partnership (Article 218 TFEU). The Declaration will 
5Ministers have to decide whether or not they agree 
to accept the consequences of the Prime Minister’s 
red lines – which are, to recap, no single market, no 
customs union, no freedom of movement, no large 
contributions to the EU budget and no European Court 
of Justice. Mr Robbins will be able to tell them that his 
efforts in Brussels over the last few months to skirt 
around the red lines have been to no avail. The EU is 
adamant that unless the government modifies its red 
lines, the UK will be lucky to leave the EU with a trade 
deal no better than that recently accorded Canada. Mr 
Davis, if he is honest, will own up that his own visits to 
other capitals attempting to undermine the cohesion 
of the 27 have also been futile: indeed, they may even 
have been counterproductive. 
If the Chequers meeting does not modify the red 
lines, the UK will pursue the Canada option, touted 
by the Brexiteers, which amounts to a minimal free 
trade agreement for manufactured goods. Services 
are left to their own devices. There would be no free 
movement of persons between the UK and the EU, no 
joint governance, and only fee-based contributions to 
the EU for services rendered. Northern Ireland would 
be governed under the separate regime set out in the 
Commission’s backstop proposal of last December, 
apparently accepted by Mrs May only in desperation. 
Border controls across the Irish Sea would have to be 
strengthened. But Great Britain would have definitively 
left the single market, the customs union and the 
common commercial policy. Britain would be free to 
set its own standards where it chose not to align with 
EU norms, and British merchants could freely roam the 
world in search of business.
Chancellor Philip Hammond and Business 
Secretary Greg Clark want the Chequers 
meeting to modify the red lines and remain 
as closely aligned as possible to the EU 
acquis so as to maximise participation  
in and access to the single market.
Chancellor Philip Hammond and Business Secretary 
Greg Clark want the Chequers meeting to modify the 
red lines and remain as closely aligned as possible 
to the EU acquis so as to maximise participation 
in and access to the single market. This implies a 
comprehensive rules-based trade and investment 
partnership with the EU to be negotiated in the form 
of an Association Agreement (Article 217 TFEU). The 
European Council and Commission have made it clear 
that they are ready to facilitate such a negotiation as 
and when the UK relaxes its red lines.5 The European 
Parliament would welcome it. I have written previously 
on how the EU’s Association Agreement with Ukraine 
of 2014 offers a useful legal template and political 
precedent for the UK.6
CUSTOMS COOPERATION
Under the auspices of the Association Agreement, 
the UK would adhere to the EU Customs Code and 
new customs cooperation arrangements would be 
introduced to minimise disruption to travel while 
ensuring verifiable respect for the EU’s level playing 
field. Nevertheless, talk of a ‘frictionless’ border is 
idle: veterinary and phytosanitary checks are always 
required, as is the levying of VAT and excise duties, 
and market surveillance to verify product standards in 
manufactured goods. If the UK goes further and stays 
in the EU customs union (as most of the Labour party 
seems to want), there will be no customs duties to levy 
and no need for rules of origin certification, but all 
those other controls will still be required, along with 
proof of status. 
Staying in the EU’s customs union means sticking 
with its common commercial policy and external 
tariff regime. Ministers are openly divided as to 
the merits of that as set against the potential (but 
wholly unproven) benefits of running an independent 
trade policy. The cabinet will have to clarify the 
government’s position one way or the other in advance 
of the vote in Parliament later in July on the trade and 
customs bill. 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Adopting the route of the Association Agreement 
means that Britain will put in place a new regulatory 
apparatus to compensate for the loss of direct 
supervision by the EU institutions of its business 
and commerce. Such home-grown regulatory 
bodies will have to be sufficiently autonomous from 
ministerial direction in order to be trusted by the 
EU Commission and Court of Auditors, as well as by 
stakeholders and consumers. The new regulators 
will enforce compliance with EU norms in terms of 
nuclear safety, citizens’ rights, quality control, labour 
rights and social and environmental standards. Mr 
Clark has already proposed that competition and 
state aids policy should fall under the aegis of the 
Competition and Markets Authority. Nuclear matters, 
bereft of Euratom, will go to the Office for Nuclear 
Regulation. Michael Gove is less forthcoming about 
how his environmental empire will be policed: his 
current proposals merely to send out advisory notices 
to entities that breach the rules, and to have regard 
to on-going EU law, do not cut the mustard. The 
Commission also harbours particular doubts about the 
capability of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to 
handle itself post-Brexit. 
However, it is only once the UK proves itself able to 
guarantee equivalent standards to those established 
by EU legislation that its new bodies will be permitted 
to participate (without a vote) in the work of the EU’s 
many agencies. In the first place, to keep the drugs 
coming, planes flying and lights on, those are the 
European Medicines Agency, the European Aviation 
Safety Agency and the Agency for the Cooperation of 
6GOVERNANCE
The Chequers meeting will be aware, too, that if 
it plumps for the Hammond market paradigm in 
preference to the Davis trade paradigm, it will be 
committing the UK to a robust system of long-term 
joint governance. The Withdrawal Agreement will 
install a Joint Committee to manage the Brexit process 
at least until the end of the transition period. That 
Joint Committee will then morph into the general 
secretariat of the joint EU-UK institutions set up to 
govern the future partnership. The structure of these 
joint institutions will be quite elaborate, involving 
summit, ministerial and parliamentary meetings as 
well as many technical committees to oversee the 
whole gamut of the association. 
An Association Agreement necessitates an effective 
dispute settlement mechanism. The British government 
and Supreme Court should make a proposal for the 
creation of a joint EU-UK tribunal. The EU may well 
insist that it maintains a majority of judges on that 
court. It will surely insist on upholding the ultimate 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in matters 
of EU law. This is a fundamental requirement. 
Brexiteers will baulk at the scale and scope of the 
institutional machinery required to manage the 
association agreement. Somebody at Chequers should 
remind them that the price of leaving the executive, 
legislative and judicial institutions of the Union leaves 
the UK with no voice at the table – a prospect which 
in her day appalled Margaret Thatcher. One purpose 
of the new joint governance arrangements will be to 
remind the EU 27 of Britain. 
The Chequers meeting will be aware, too, 
that if it plumps for the Hammond market 
paradigm in preference to the Davis trade 
paradigm, it will be committing the UK to a 
robust system of long-term joint governance. 
TIMING
Brexiteers also reject the idea that the transition 
period should be extended beyond 2020. They fear that 
if the UK is still ‘in transition’ at the time of the next 
general election in May 2022, it will be possible for a 
new prime minister somehow to halt Brexit. That will 
not be the case. The UK will already have left the EU 
under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement and 
preparations for the future partnership, as articulated 
in the Political Declaration, will be far advanced. 
After 29 March 2019 any radical change of course, 
such as a return to the status quo ante, could not be 
accomplished under the terms of Article 50. 
Energy Regulators. But there are few sectors of any 
European economy, third country or not, that can 
happily ignore the scope and force of EU regulation. 
The European Environmental Agency, for example, and 
the European Food Safety Authority play critical roles. 
The cabinet needs to know that  
the EU insists the treatment of movement  
of people be reciprocal.
SECURITY
The Prime Minister, at least, knows that it is a matter 
of vital national interest that the UK concludes, and 
quickly, one or more security treaties with the EU in 
matters of data protection, intelligence sharing, civil 
justice, police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
affairs and collaboration in EU foreign, security 
and defence policies. Such chapters of the new 
Association Agreement would allow continued British 
participation (without a vote) in Europol and Eurojust. 
They would also be the basis for UK involvement in 
the work of the European Defence Agency and the 
Galileo space project. 
MOBILITY
Professional services and goods-related services 
constitute over 80% of the British economy and over 
70% of the EU economy.7 Each is the other’s largest 
single services customer. Because the government is 
determined to stop the free movement of EU citizens 
into Britain, and because it is people who deliver 
services, Britain’s service economy is in trouble. In 
negotiating the association agreement, the EU will be 
stricter on services than on goods, and will bar British 
participation in those sectors of its internal market, 
notably banking and insurance, which are heavily 
regulated at EU level. The UK’s new approach will focus 
on maximising the mobility of EU workers, subject to 
a registration scheme, including seasonal agricultural 
workers. Presumably the UK will continue to respect 
EU law on the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications, and transnational companies will be able 
to operate intra-company transfer of staff. A question 
mark hangs over the fees payable by EU students at 
British universities. 
The cabinet needs to know that the EU insists the 
treatment of movement of people be reciprocal: 
any restrictions imposed on EU citizens applying to 
study or work in the UK will be met by comparable 
constraints on British citizens in the EU. British 
limitations on the right of EU citizens to establish 
business in the UK, or to carry services, will meet like 
with like across the EU. 
7If ministers fail to agree to ask the EU to 
extend the transition period and if they 
fail to accept a large measure of continued 
regulatory alignment with the EU, along 
with joint governance, the UK is headed for 
a very hard Brexit.
What is the case, however, is that the full Association 
Agreement will not have entered into force by  
1 January 2021. Nor will streamlined customs 
procedures be fully operational. So an extension of 
the transition period is inevitable, and provision for 
that must be made under the terms of the Withdrawal 
Agreement. The cabinet at Chequers should instruct  
Mr Davis to immediately ask for such an extension 
clause, whether he likes it or not. 
All sides are placing great weight on the Chequers 
meeting. No doubt too much is being expected. But 
if ministers fail to agree to ask the EU to extend the 
transition period and if they fail to accept a large 
measure of continued regulatory alignment with the 
EU, along with joint governance, the UK is headed 
for a very hard Brexit. The EU will react swiftly and 
negatively to a wrong-headed outcome from Chequers. 
Equally, if the meeting is constructive and the signals 
positive, the EU stands ready to open talks on the 
drafting of the Political Declaration, even in August.
An extension of the transition period is 
inevitable, and provision for that must be 
made under the terms of the Withdrawal 
Agreement. 
1 Most recently, Brexit: What Theresa May’s White Paper must do, 
EPC Discussion Paper, 16 May 2018.
2 House of Commons Exiting the EU Committee, Parliamentary 
Scrutiny and approval of the Withdrawal Agreement and 
negotiations on a future relationship, 28 June 2018. 
3 European Parliament Resolution on Brexit, 14 March 2018. 
4 The Prime Minister has summoned her whole cabinet to a 
crisis meeting at her country house residence on Friday 6 July. 
5 See especially the European Council guidelines of 23 March 
2018. 
6 For example, Brexit: Half In, Half Out or Right Out?, EPC 
Discussion Paper, 6 March 2018.
7 See the letter from the European Services Forum to MM. 
Barnier and Davis, 26 June 2018. 
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